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Introduction: The Irony of Mathematical
Mechanical Laws
The subject of this entry is the emergence
of mathematical laws in the development of
mechanistic methodology within natural philoso-
phy during the early modern period. The specific-
ity of the emergence of mathematical laws in
mechanics should be immediately addressed
because of the ambiguity between this and the
more general issue of the so-called mathematiza-
tion of nature that has been used to characterize
the essence of the “scientific revolution” during
sixteenth and seventeenth century European
history of science. To capture the problem of
this ambiguity, we note that the very idea of the
“laws of nature” is rooted in a very specific idea
of Deus legislator pertaining to nature (Daston
and Stolleis 2008). Those who identified with
the label of “mechanical philosophy” and other
close allies to the project often employed the idea
and terminology of natural “laws” but few of
them ventured into giving mathematical descrip-
tions of them. In hindsight, it could be seen that, at
least logically or conceptually, the mechanistic
ontology of interlocking physical relations
(reduced either to a plenum world of impinge-
ments and constraints, or to a world system of
atoms, etc.) obviated the need for abstract “laws”
since the models using mechanical parts made
abstract laws redundant in the explanation of
nature (Menn 1990; Garber 2016). Excluding
creation itself, divine legislation is redundant
to the machinic causal form of nature. Hence
mechanism does not logically require the legisla-
tion of God. What room does this leave for
mathematization?
The role of mathematical laws in mechanistic
philosophy is then a conceptually ironic problem.
If one conceptually reduces physics to the nature
of machines, then mathematical laws of nature
are just the property of machines. It may be
striking to the modern reader, accustomed to the
“mathematical” meaning of mechanics, that the
turn to machines as models for physical motion
is not already synonymous with mathematical
explanation. After all, the ancient traditions
of mechanics (Pseudo-Aristotle, Archimedes,
etc.) employed geometry to explain machines.
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However, the classical treatment of machines
through geometry made use only of proportions
and did not extend beyond the adaptation of
the proportions of the lever (the two factors of
weight and distance to the fulcrum) to various
circumstances (Dijksterhuis 1961, 497–501).
Furthermore, the distinction between natural and
“violent,” or mechanical, motion, upheld into
the seventeenth century meant that machines
could not, without further mediation or interpre-
tation, stand in for natural phenomena. The gen-
eral mechanistic methodology of a reduction
of natural phenomenon to machines was a
qualitative reduction. This qualitative reduction
obviously included the narrow domain for the
geometrical description of machines. However,
this methodology of reduction to the machine
also implied a restriction on the autonomy and
generality of the mathematical content of physical
explanation.
Nonetheless what we have sketched here is
only a conceptual irony. In practice, this apparent
conflict between mechanical reduction and
mathematical methods was actually more about
mutually reinforcing steps toward an expansion of
both mechanics and mathematics. With Stevin,
Kepler, Galileo, and others, we find successive
strategies explaining the properties of corporeal
motion through the use of mechanical models.
Mechanical relations were abstracted from
the machines that provided the simplified
exemplar of these properties (Gabbey 1985;
Mahoney 1998; Bertoloni Meli 2006). Hence
the incline plane was used to extract mathematical
proportions corresponding to the motion of
bodies in free fall; pendulums were used to treat
the conservation of invariants between magnitude
and periodicity; and levers were used to address
collision properties. The mathematization of
mechanics was part and parcel to the extraction
of general principles of motion away from the
machines that exemplified them. As principles
were generalized, their mathematical descriptions
also became generic to physical explanation.
This process of abstraction also implied the
mechanization of mathematics itself. New mathe-
matical objects like the so-called mechanical
curves (the tractrix, etc.) emerged out of this
hybridization of disciplines (Bos 1988, 2001).
As mechanics became a thoroughly mathematical
discipline, the purity of the Euclidian mathemati-
cal world was disturbed by objects which were
previously inadmissible (Knobloch 2006). This
historical transformation makes sense of the
irony of mathematical mechanical laws. The
reduction of physics to mechanics does not reduce
physics to machines per se. The mechanistic
reduction provided an avenue for the expansion
of the concept of mathematical laws through the
abstraction of mathematical principles from the
machines that served as the model of explanation.
In what follows we will address this
tension between the resistance of mechanistic
reduction to abstract mathematical principles and
the abstraction of mathematical principles from
mechanical exemplars. With the triumph of
Newtonian mechanics seen as the beginning of
a new chapter in physics where mechanics could
be unquestionably be presumed to be unambigu-
ously mathematical, the discipline of mechanics,
as the theoretical core of physics writ large, fails
to be mechanical in the traditional sense of
the word. Namely, action at the distance demon-
strated the autonomy of mathematical mechanics
from its machinic struts. The irony of the very
idea of mechanistic mathematical laws left us
with an even more fundamental problem, one
that we have yet to fully resolve.
Mechanical Reduction and Geometrical
Proportions
To note the reinforcement of the abstraction of
mathematical principles from mechanics and the
limitation of mechanics for the generalization of
mathematical principles, it is valuable to consider
an early and crucial waypoint in this move
towards mathematical mechanics. We first exam-
ine Stevin’s “wreath” and consider a few more
problems in the conflict between mathematization
and the reduction to machines.
Stevin (1548–1620) was Galileo’s
(1564–1642) contemporary and, like Galileo, is
perhaps most remembered for his work on the
incline plane and the classical machines of
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antiquity. Like Galileo, he contributed to the
theory of the distribution of the action of gravity
on a body in the incline plane. In Stevin’s 1586
De beghinselen der Weeghconst (Elements of the
Art of Weighing), he introduces a demonstration
for the distribution of weighted masses on an
incline plane in terms of its center of gravity.
Here he places a “wreath” of equally spaced
masses connected by an idealized massless and
flexible cord on an incline and notices that the
symmetrical hanging of the wreath beneath the
triangle implies the symmetry of the distribution
of the masses in the incline above (Fig. 1).
The result here is that the action of “gravity,” or
weight (in the pre-Newtonian context), on these
different masses on the sides of unequal length,
but with a common height, is the sines of the base
angles. This geometrical interpretation identifies
the equilibrium according to the center of gravity
for the triangle. This allows his machine to be thus
reducible to the lever (Mahoney 1998).
What is crucial here is that Stevin’s treatment
of weight (or pre-Newtonian gravity) does not
provide any conceptual movement beyond the
reduction to the lever. In fact, it stands as a
demonstration of the law of the lever. That is,
since the wreath is reducible to the lever, it
demonstrates the generality of equilibrium for
more complex machines. Yet in this, despite its
important ingenuity, the demonstration remains
nominally within the earlier tradition of the
qualitative translation of a complex machine to a
simpler one. Indeed, Stevin’s key insight is
precisely the mechanical translation of a more
complex configuration to a simple and given
one. For this to be the case, the hanging chain
below the incline figure represents symmetry. The
hanging chain pulls equally on both sides of
the figure. That is, if one side pulled more “force-
fully,” a perpetual machine would result since
the slipping of the wreath toward either side of
the incline would reproduce the same distribution
of weights on the triangle and thus that slipping
must continue. While there is some controversy
about the exact role that perpetual machine argu-
ments have for Stevin in this context, for our
purposes it only suffices to say that the rejection
of perpetual motion is required for Stevin’s
argument to hold (Van Dyck 2017).
This abstraction of a geometrical distribution
of the action of gravity on an incline plane is not
unrelated to Galileo’s later treatments of freefall
through the incline. However, Stevin’s demon-
stration provides a key instance of the extraction
of mathematical principles from machines. It
identifies the angular proportions for the down-
ward action of bodies on inclines. This principle
indeed provided an important avenue for the
treatment of the abstracted notion of downward
attraction (weight or gravity). However, the dem-
onstration also remains tied to the machine itself.
After all, the demonstration and its elaboration
required a reduction to the given properties of
the lever instead of properly independent physical
principles. This is not to say that, in retrospect,
such an extrapolation from the machine to abstract
principles could not readily be made. However,
within the context of demonstration, Stevin brid-
ges the methods of Greek mechanics and the
aspirations for an abstracted and general mathe-
matical mechanics.
With this brief look at an aspect of Stevin’s
important contribution to the emergence of
mathematical mechanics at the start of the early
modern period, we saw a clear example of how
mathematical principles emerged out of the con-
ceptual interplay between complex and simple
Mechanism: Mathematical Laws, Fig. 1 Stevin’s
Wreath (Stevin 1634, 448)
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machines. We highlighted the potential abstrac-
tion of a general mathematical principle from a
case of mechanical reduction. However, we also
underlined the limitation of this methodology of
a reduction to the law of the lever. What follows
in this entry will treat how an expandedmechanics
converges with the attempt to abstract and gener-
alize the mathematical content caught within
the reduction of complex physical phenomena to
simple machines.
The Crystallization of Mathematical
Mechanical Laws
We began by briefly examining Stevin’s wreath.
In some sense, this 1586 work provides a general
starting point of early modern mechanics. We
have also mentioned Stevin’s near contemporary
Galileo who also represented a transitional
figure who had one foot in the earlier mechanical
tradition while reaching toward a more abstract
and generalized mathematical physics. We now
turn to what we might call a point of crystalliza-
tion for mathematical laws in mechanics. This
is the 1669 volume of the Philosophical
Transactions where Oldenburg (the general sec-
retary of the Royal Society and the editor of
the journal) collected responses to a call for
revisiting Descartes’ laws of collision presented
in the second book of Principia philosophiae. The
group of three reformers, Wallis, Wren, and
Huygens, presented different approaches to either
reform or replace the Cartesian laws.
Why should we trace mathematical laws in
mechanics to this event? The historiography here
is complex and not clearly adjudicated in the
scholarly literature. As we have already men-
tioned, it was surely not Descartes, and hence
not Wallis, Wren, or Huygens, who first posited
mathematical laws. None of these thinkers was
either the first to propose mathematical interpre-
tations of mechanics. As we mentioned, the
mathematical (i.e., geometrical) treatment of
machines is a rich tradition that goes back at
least to antiquity (Pseudo-Aristotle, Archimedes,
Pappus of Alexandria, John Philoponus, etc.).
Closer to the moderns, Jordanus de Nemore
(thirteenth century), Buridan (and other members
of the fourteenth century Paris school), theMerton
school (fourteenth century), and other commenta-
tors of this tradition (Clagett 1959). When Galileo
wrote a textbook Le Meccaniche around 1598
(first published in French translation by
M. Mersenne as Les mécaniques de Galilée in
1634) on the subject, he treated the subject in
following the basic framework of this tradition.
This framework, to be explicit, was the propor-
tional explanation (demonstration) of the behavior
of the five simple machines (Galileo and Stevin
include a sixth machine: the incline plane). Few of
its contents, while innovative in many respects,
made it into what he considered “new science,”
the subject of his famous 1638 dialogue (outside
of the incline plane). Galileo took himself in
the earlier textbook to be curating pedagogical
material and updating the methods of a long tra-
dition in which he was a contributor.
The historiographical issue here is that, at least
for the generation of early modern figures like
Galileo, Tartaglia, and Stevin, while mechanics
had made use of mathematical methods for
some time, this has not been undertaken under
the aegis of a general mathematization of nature.
Confined to the geometrical ratios of the parts
of machines (and their movement), the later
treatment of machines as isolated models of
aspects of nature (the experiment) had not yet
been entirely adopted. If one is to follow Koyré
(1939), Galileo sought a mathematical project for
the explanation of nature under a Platonizing
motivation. However, his segregation of the new
sciences from the tradition of mechanics is telling.
Hence, we can say that in the early seventeenth
century, mathematical mechanics partially con-
verged with the mathematization of nature but,
due to its own dense and rigorous tradition, cannot
be identified as identical with this shared program.
The conceptual irony here has already been
mentioned. In a parochial sense, machines qua
artifice are precisely the opposite of natural things.
This is an idea that Pseudo-Aristotle and
Archimedes make clear: machines “cheat” nature
for the benefit of the artificer. The “natural”
motions of bodies, from Aristotelian physics, are
“perverted” into unnatural or “violent” motion
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through mechanics. Hence if machines determine
the target of demonstration and any mathematical
method serves to describe and explain their
behavior, the issue of natural laws is left aside by
definition.
Hence in 1669, something else took place. The
subsumption of mechanics, under the rubric of
the mathematization of nature, has crystallized
enough to be taken as a kind of assumption.
Crucially, the three reformers, Wallis, Wren, and
Huygens, were explicitly asked to respond to the
implications of Descartes’ laws of motion and
the seven main rules of collision that resulted.
Here, ancient mechanics was turned on its head.
Instead of a mathematical description of the
machine as a whole, the issue was the mathemat-
ical description of a particular principle of
mechanical constraint: impact. In this context,
the parochial understanding of mechanics was
loosened. The mathematical rules of impact are
understood as the natural underpinnings of an
aspect of the behavior of machines. This reinter-
prets the relation between artifice and nature by
providing the notion of machines as the funda-
mental elements of the aggregate and complex
machine that is nature itself. The relations
between natural laws and mechanical principles
were also reshuffled. Descartes’s three natural
laws are distinct from the rules of impact-collision
insofar as the rules are not the laws themselves,
but the rules govern the specific cases of their
application. Hence, the traditional notion of
mechanics is superseded by a new mathematical
theory of body-to-body impact, while the notion
of the laws of nature is deepened and concretized
by the examination of how it regulates body-to-
body relations regardless of its classification in the
traditional mechanical schema. Those “violent”
motions were now casually treated as the constit-
uent causes of nature itself.
The Reformof Descartes’ Physics and the
Mathematization of Mechanics
With this in mind, the 1669 interventions of the
three reformers were meant to rectify obvious
problems with the Cartesian collision rules.
What we have outlined so far is the historio-
graphic and conceptual reason to treat this as
the focus of the emergence of mechanical mathe-
matical laws. The reason for this 1669 interven-
tion was due to Descartes’s own failure to
complete this task. Without giving a comprehen-
sive account of how the Cartesian rules were
faulty, we can simply identify two basic issues
about the rules themselves and one larger concep-
tual issue lurking behind these rules but not
explicitly addressed by the three reformers. The
first basic issue is the distribution of the “quantity
of motion” at work in collisions (a problem we
understand as the property of elasticity within
impact). The second basic issue is the universal
conservation of force. The larger conceptual issue
that emerges from the two is whether forces really
belong to bodies or are merely laws governing the
external system of motion. We shall look at these
issues briefly in turn.
The Distribution of Motion in Corporeal
Collision
In Descartes’ own order of reasons in the
Principia, he first formulates three laws of nature,
namely, first, the proto-inertial concept that bodies
will remain in their state unless acted on by
another cause; second, the essential linearity of
corporeal motion; and third, that in the concourse
between impacting bodies, the greater force pre-
vails (AT VIII 62–65; see Clarke 1977). The next
seven rules follow from these laws by explicitly
spelling out the nature of impact stated in the
third law. The first rule states that bodies of
equal quantities of matter (what Descartes calls
size, an imprecise analogue to later concepts of
mass) and possessing equal values of speed
(impacting velocities) will rebound each other,
deflecting each other with resultant equal speeds.
This means that Cartesian force, otherwise called
the “quantity of motion” is a product of the quan-
tity of matter (i.e., mass) and the speed
(F ¼ m  v). The force of each of the colliding
bodies in the first rule is equal, and the reciprocal
rebounding is an intuitive result. Although
Cartesian speed is not precise enough to include
direction in his measurement of speed, a problem
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noticed and rectified by all three reformers in their
work, the general point is uncontroversial.
So far so good. However, problems start
arising in the next rules. Descartes considers in
the second and third rule instances where either
the quantity of matter of one body is greater than
the other, or the values of speed of one body is
greater than the other. In both cases, the Cartesian
force of one body (due to the greater value of
one of the two factors on the right side of
F¼ m  v) will overcome the other body. Instead
of finding a means of redistributing the difference
between the two F ¼ m  v values after collision
in different velocities after rebounding, Descartes
erroneously argued that the body with the
greater force will determine the direction that
both bodies will follow after impact. The total
force of the system of two bodies will be distrib-
uted between the two bodies moving in the same
direction post-collision.
The error contained in this thesis of the
dominance of the stronger force to determine the
direction of both bodies after impact is the main
issue for all three reformers (Murray et al. 2011).
In the simplest terms, the problem here is that
since the quantity of motion is not calculated
with direction in mind, the body with the greater
quantity of motion will determine the direction of
both bodies after impact. This “winner take all”
determination of direction was an error immedi-
ately motivating all the reformers here. However,
beyond the mere issue of whether quantity of
motion is meant to be determined by mv, mjvj,
ormv, all three reformers recognized the deeper
point that the quantity of motion (with direction)
is redistributed between the bodies in rebounding.
The three reformers differed in terms of the prin-
ciples through which this distribution in
rebounding occurs. Wallis and Wren agree that
the quantity of motion with direction before
collision is conserved between the two bodies
after collision (and redistributed between them).
Huygens argues for a different measure, the
quantity mv2, conserved before and after colli-
sion. In terms of a rectilinear collision, Huygens’
theory introduces a new conservation property
above and beyond a mere rectification of the
Cartesian rules. The two factors of quantity of
matter (i.e., mass) and speed (i.e., velocity) do
not play the same role in the determination of
how force is redistributed after collision. Here,
an additional factor of v must be calculated in
the redistribution of motion after impact. This,
for Huygens, replaces the mv calculation for the
quantity of motion in favor for mv2, which he saw
as the better candidate for the meaning of “force”
or “power”.
This gives us the conservation of the rectified
quantity of motion with direction supported by
Wallis and Wren (where A and B are bodies in
linear head-on collision, and v and v0 are speeds
before and after collision):
mAvA þ mBvB ¼ mAv0A þ mBv0B




A þ mBv2B ¼ mAv02A þ mBv02B
The Huygensian formulation is consistent
with the rectified quantity of motion but is not
a trivial result. With a more basic concept of
reference frame displacement, we can derive any
of these three equations if we have two of them:
vA  vB ¼  v0A  v0B
 
:
This system of equations for conservation
of both quantity of motion and Huygensian
“force” was developed explicitly by Leibniz, a
later enthusiastic inheritor of this problem
(Darrigol 2014, 17).
The issue of distribution of motion in impact
was not only a rectification of the errors in
Descartes’ rules but also highlighted fundamental
problems in mechanics well into the eighteenth
and nineteenth century. The problem of elasticity
in collision was put on center stage. Between
the three reformers only Wallis addressed the
cases of inelastic collision (as when a hard ball
impacts soft putty). What is the distribution of
motion in such cases of hard and soft collisions?
The related and more historically famous problem
was the ensuing conflict over the two different
conservation quantities presented by Wallis and
Wren, on one side, and Huygens on the other.
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The conservation mv2 will be later taken up by
Leibniz as being not only physically significant
but metaphysically as well. It was the debate
over this quantity, later coined vis viva by
Leibniz, that will dominate a corner of eighteenth
century physics with new insights promoted by
the Bernoullis, Euler, du Cha^telet, D’Alembert,
and eventually Lagrange.1
What is most important about this first
aspect of the three reformers’ response to
Descartes is the establishment of the distribution
and conservation of quantities under impact as
an independent mechanical problem. Even if
Descartes had first given his collision rules under
the banner of a universally conserved quantity
(the quantity of motion), where since the universe
as such (due to God’s constant concurrence) con-
serves the quantity of motion, each local interac-
tion must also conserve this quantity of motion
(mv), the three reformers have provided the
logical space for impact collisions as a locus of
mechanical insights. From this, mechanics drills
down to abstract and isolated body-to-body rela-
tions. Mathematical mechanics become neither
the proportional relation of the parts of machines
(even if they involve impact) nor do they reduce to
a Platonic mathematical world. Insights about
impact and its modalities are given its own genre
to provide the basis of other universal hypotheses.
Certainly here, the disputes between Wallis,
Wren, and Huygens will provide fodder for larger
debates about the nature of “force,” understood as
the conserved quantity in the universe. Yet, these
debates will only draw from this domain of the
inquiry about impact, rather than being implied by
them. In this sense, the mathematization of
mechanics is anchored to this point. That is, first,
the problems of collisions are not themselves the
problems of the mathematization of nature.
Secondly, the problems of collisions do not reduce
to the traditional mechanics of the proportions of
machines. The independence of the collision
problem thus highlights the unique case of the
mathematical laws in mechanics itself.
The Conservation of the Quantity of Motion
The second aspect in question here is the universal
conserved quantity in motion. The origin of
the debates about Cartesian force concerns not
only its measurement and distribution in collision
but more fundamentally its role as the conserved
quantity that determines the physical closure of
the created world. The term “force” should, in this
context, be completely disassociated with the
Newtonian-Eulerian idea that F ¼ ma (where
F is force, m is mass, and a acceleration), but as
a placeholder term for a universal conservation
first indicated by Descartes. The very notion of
a universally conserved quantity in nature is a
curious one. Mechanistic philosophy does not
suppose it nor do earlier theories about machines.
It is, however, the crucial logical link between
natural law and mathematical laws. This link
was first developed by Descartes. In Descartes’
view, God’s constancy is reflected in the natural
world through the conservation of a constant
quantity of motion in the universe (Gabbey
1971; Hattab 2007). This naturally lends itself to
a mechanical image (perhaps the mechanical
image) of the lever. Motion on one side of the
fulcrum is compensated by a corresponding
motion on the other side of the fulcrum. The
fundamental “balance” of nature is constant
while there may be an infinite variation of modal
shifts in the pitch of the balance itself. In terms of
a model of the universe, this provides the sine qua
non of the mechanical world-picture. However,
this is an interpretation that would not suit
Cartesianism in the strict sense. Here, while
Cartesians would have no quarrel with the
mechanical metaphor for the natural world and
its structure, and even less disagreement about
the reduction of natural causes to impact and
constraint, the reason for this constancy through
conservation is argued from the perspective of a
Divine legislator who, through its own constancy,
guarantees the constancy of nature. Conservation
as a feature of the universe as a total closed
and interlocking machine is only a result of the
more fundamental concurrence of God on the
1The vis viva conflict lived on into the twentieth century
and receives the currently canonical treatment by Emmy
Noether.
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works of nature.2 Of course here, the fraught
idea that minds can be the cause of physical
change deeply upsets the “balance” of a universal
conservation based on a closed circuit of changes
in motion in the universe (Menn 1990; Gabbey
1985). Do the movements of bodies by minds
satisfy universal conservation? We leave this
inconvenience aside.
The conservation of Cartesian force, the quan-
tity of motion, is truly a law of nature rather than
a mechanical law insofar as this conservation is
not an immanent feature of the machine but an
imposed legislation ontologically guaranteed
by the nature of a concurrent God. However, if
this is the case, there would be no strong logical
case for inferring the claim that local physical
interactions must reflect this global conservation.
Nothing prevents that what God adds to one cor-
ner of the universe can be subtracted from another.
For this, local uniformity must be added to con-
stancy. The reading of force as a conservation
quantity (whether we accept the Cartesian quan-
tity of motion or not) in isolated body-to-body
impact is presumed but not explicitly argued for.
Yet this is what is assumed by all three reformers.
Force, even if one disagrees about its measure or
fine structure, is the placeholder for the quantity
that is conserved in all and any impact, building
from body-to-body relations to the universe as
such. Hence, while the three reformers do not
deal with any of the metaphysics or theology of
conservation, the implicit assumption is that
global conservation arises from the uniformity of
local conservation. The assumed notion is hence,
without any explicit argument, that if the laws
of mechanics are laws, then they are expressed
through this mathematical description of
conservation. The conservation of force, either
following the Cartesian quantity or otherwise,
becomes a mechanical law then, instead of a
global conservation property of the universe.
The Cartesian view of global conservation is
left out of the discussion by the mainstream of
mechanistic philosophies. It is most conspicu-
ously absent in the Newtonian framework that
faced challenge by the Leibnizian view that there
is such a global conservation albeit with the mea-
sure mv2 or vis viva.
The work of the three reformers is significant in
the respect of representing a shift in how conser-
vation is used in the discussion of impact. The
search for a conserved force is transformed from a
governing system of the total system of motions in
creation to the generic instance of any case of
impact. The logical status of conservation thus
allows the shift from the mathematization of
the total system of nature to the generic descrip-
tion of the systematic unit of mechanical
interaction.
The Inherent Properties of Bodies
This shift from nature writ large to local configu-
rations raises a pressing question about mechani-
cal philosophy that would become a raging issue
in what follows in the wake of the three reformers.
Do forces reside in bodies? Again here, Descartes
provides the starting point of the controversy.
Since, for Descartes, bodies are nothing but their
extension (i.e., size, shape, and motion), the trans-
fer of force between bodies in impact (impetus
transfer derided as influxus physicus) is written
out of the basic theory of motion (O’Neill 1993).
In this sense, the notion of “laws” of motion is a
theory of the “governance” of the changes of
motions between externally related bodies
through physical events. Yet, Descartes also freely
speaks of the “carrying” and “transfer” of forces in
physical interactions (Menn 1990). Worse yet, for
the dualist, it seems as if souls must “add”motion
to the embodied entities acting in the physical
world, breaking the mechanical closure of the
world. Are forces external relations or are they
properties possessed by individual bodies?
Bracketing the more difficult issue of
embodiment, two views about inherence are
available to us. First, the force of resistance
provides an instance of inherent force.
2Cartesian divine concurrence is the idea that God punctu-
ally sustains the continued existence of the world. This is
contrasted with strict deismwhere God creates the universe
as a machine and allows it to unfold its enfolded properties
in time without added intervention. It is also contrasted
with strict occasionalism where the world is recreated
punctually. Concurrence stands in the middle of a spectrum
between no intervention (outside of creation) and complete
ontological dependence. See Menn (1990).
8 Mechanism: Mathematical Laws
In other words, if a massive body at rest resists the
force of an impact, this seems to imply a force of
resistance (against impact) that is irreducible to
mere extensionality. Something “intensive” must
reside in the body that causes this resistance.
Against this, Descartes originally reasoned that
any resistance by a body must be reducible to
magnitude (the quantity of extension), therefore
this implies that no body at rest can be moved by
the impact of a moving body of lesser magnitude
(AT IV 183–188). Taken as a whole, Descartes
sets up an all or nothing approach to resistance.
Either a resting body resists impact and remains
immobile (resistance), or bodies in collision enter
into an exchange of speeds (not a case of resis-
tance) which fall under one of his seven rules for
impact. Resistance is not associated with inertia or
elasticity as we tend to think of them in modern
terms (AT II 467). Yet, if we consider resistance to
be a contributing factor of impact, the interrelation
of bodies with varying degrees of mass and
speeds renders resistance as a kind of activity of
the body. Hence with this activity of resistance,
bodies cannot be the Cartesian inert res extensa.
A second view is the inherence of force
implied by the Huygensian method. Force can
only be the invariance measured by all the shifts
of the reference frame according to which we have
values for all the moving bodies. This implies that
a deeper structural reality governs the motion of
any system of bodies through the quantity of
“force” (Huygensian force mv2). In Huygens’
demonstration, this is illustrated by the consider-
ation of a set of differing reference frames of
colliding bodies understood as one system
through the shared center of gravity. No exchange
of motion in the system can raise this center or,
what is equivalent, increase the total quantity of
mv2 in the system.
These two dimensions of the problem implied
the viability of an inherence of force within a
system of moving bodies. For the first issue of
the “force” of resistance, while a vast number
of key figures writing in the wake of this 1669
text like Leibniz saw this as an indication of
the foolishness of Cartesian theory of inert bodies,
later developments of the theory of inertia, where
the active nature of corporeal resistance is
absorbed by law-like equal and opposite reaction
(as we find in Newton’s third law), allowed for
an ontologically neutral interpretation of resis-
tance. The second issue, Huygens’ notion of
force as invariance, also received, in the later
work of D’Alembert, an interpretation through a
structural distribution of motion, avoiding the
implication of the inherence of forces in bodies.
Yet what remains pertinent is a logical connection
between the system of colliding bodies under-
stood as a machine (with a center of gravity) and
the physical world as an interrelated system of
aggregations of such machines. Here, the law is
not an externally legislated behavior of otherwise
free bodies but an explanation of the properties of
a machine. More importantly, this is a machine
concept abstracted from particular instances of
the five simple machines (six, if one includes the
incline). From this perspective, it is Huygens that
fully delivers a nascent version of mechanical
mathematical laws. That is, it is fully mechanical
insofar as this vision of physics is predicated
not on externally governing laws but on the
explanation of machines. However, it is also
based on a radically abstracted notion of
machines, even to systems of bodies governed
only by the center of gravity with no individual
body-to-body interactions.
With this recognition of Huygens’ important
contribution, it should be underlined that this
interpretation of collision laws was not fully
expounded in his 1669 contribution to the
Philosophical Transactions. Huygens has submit-
ted only a part of his larger work on collision to
Oldenburg (editor of the volume and secretary of
the Royal Society). Worse yet, only a summary
of this small sample was actually published.
Huygens was unsatisfied with the treatment of
his work and published a French version of the
sample in the Journal des sc¸avans in the same
year (1669). However, this text, while standing
as a fuller demonstration of his theory, also did
not fully display the extent of his insights. His
elaborated treatise De motu corporum ex
percussione, completed some 10 or 15 years
before this event, was only published
posthumously in the 1703 collection Opuscula
posthuma. Nonetheless, his long-time mentee
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Leibniz was clearly well-acquainted with
his views and saw in Huygens’ methodological
innovations and theoretical results the grounds of
a fundamentally new start to physics which he
would name the dynamics based on the quantity
of force as mv2 (Duchesneau 1994; Tho 2017).
Leibniz’s contribution to the new post-1669
mathematical mechanics was considerable.
However, for our purposes here, it is sufficient
to underline his development of the Huygensian
line of reasoning about the use of the invariant
mv2 and center of gravity arguments in the
development of a new kind of physics which he
calls dynamics. Leibniz developed a system of
metaphysical implications for this dynamics
which we will not discuss here. Unfortunately,
like his mentor Huygens, the core of these
physical theories was not published in their
lifetimes. Yet, Leibniz’s outlining of the meta-
physical stakes in published works like the first
part of the Specimen dynamicum and his use
of Huygensian arguments against the Cartesian
faction drew closer attention to a methodology
in physics that privileged the mathematical
description of machine-like models of fundamen-
tal physical behavior. Instead of the behavior of
individual free bodies, the developments in this
line of thought took as the target of explanation a
system of bodies governed by an invariant.
Conclusion: From Machines to Laws
The fundamental historical irony at the end of
this trajectory from Stevin to Leibniz-Newton is
that while Leibniz pursued a fundamentally
mechanical (i.e., machinic) notion of physical
systems, the extension of these models to the
totality of physical reality required extravagant
metaphysical ideas about the interconnectedness
of the world as a divine machine. Against this
path, the metaphysically parsimonious path
taken by Newton and the Newtonians focused on
grounding the relation between free bodies. The
fundamental laws of Newton and their immediate
corollaries explain motion from elemental and
isolated free bodies.
Here irony strikes again. Universal gravita-
tional attraction precisely lacks mechanical (i.e.,
efficient) cause. Hence with Leibniz and Newton,
both inheritors of the 1669 papers, we find two
opposite poles of a spectrum neither of whom
satisfies the original Cartesian framing of the
debate but which also do not converge to provide
a final concluding picture to the meaning of
mathematical mechanics at the end of the seven-
teenth century.
There are deeper methodological and
metaphysical reasons for the divergence of the
Leibnizian program, a more conservative project
rooted in an expansion of ancient mechanics
and Cartesian debates, and the Newtonian one, a
progressive reorganization of the basis of mechan-
ics on the notion of the interaction between
free bodies. Even if Leibniz did not always appeal
to his larger philosophical agenda in his scientific
work, he did frequently remind his readers
of the importance of its theological and metaphys-
ical stakes. Newton, on the other hand, was
always reticent to go beyond the explicit content
of experimental results and mathematical demon-
strations. The diametric opposition between
the two thinkers is deeply striking from the basis
of motivation. However, with respect to the
commitment to mechanistic uniformity of expla-
nation, Leibniz strangely becomes the champion
of mechanical foundation while Newton becomes
the adventurer staking a claim in the world of
unseen forces.
When Leibniz criticizes Newton for the lack of
a mechanical explanation for gravitation, this is
made on the basis of a pre-given notion of the
universe as a complete, albeit infinite, divine
machine. Certainly, both Leibniz and Newton
would agree that machines exist and so do aggre-
gates of machines, acting together to produce
complex phenomena. However, the obligation to
provide a mechanical explanation only holds if the
closed mechanical totality of the world is granted.
It is on this point that Newton’s universal gravita-
tion presents an alternative. While keeping all
the mechanical insights gained from predecessors
and prudentially seeking mechanical explanation
where possible, Newton presented the interactions
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of the free body as the fundamental generic ele-
ment of physical interaction.
It should be worth adding here that the lack of
mechanical explanation for universal gravity was
consistent with the Baconian experimental
method. Here we leave ample room for the
description of experimental phenomena without
speculation on underlying causes. Indeed, with
the analogy made between gravity and magne-
tism, mathematical description of phenomena
can be precise without being mechanically
explained. Yet this is precisely where “law” stands
in to hold up a mathematically precise principle
(like universal gravitation) where no mechanical
cause can be fully determined.3 The notion of
a mechanical mathematical law, which may be
initially seen as an oxymoron, now appears to be
the most delicate and efficacious way to sustain
and project an unfinished but promising research
program.
Newton’s program and the subsequent
formation of a “classical mechanics” based on
the eventual incorporation of Leibniz’s vis viva
theories by D’Alembert and Lagrange carries out
the accomplishment of a notion of mechanics
that we are familiar with today. Mechanics is itself
divorced from the narrower inquiry into the
behavior of machines. As a universal vision, clas-
sical mechanics is also dissociated from the meta-
physical speculation (made by thinkers like
Leibniz) of treating the physical world through
the image of an infinitely complex aggregate of
machines.4 Of course, this image was not
contradicted and still remained available to
thinkers from this period to the work of Mach,
late into the nineteenth century. However, the very
target of mechanics shifts definitively from an
inquiry about the relations between parts of a
connected machine to the principles behind
those connections. The machine is dissolved
thus into principles. Generalized, these principles
are laws. Impact, first and foremost, but also
resistance, elasticity, inertia, and the like were
reduced to elemental laws and definitions from
which machines are analyzed. The result here is
a classical mechanics where machines have all
but disappeared. This represents the apotheosis
of the conceptual conflict between mechanical
philosophy and the mathematical mechanical
laws that we have been tracing throughout.
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